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COMMENT
PREVENTING ABUSE OF DISCOVERY IN
FEDERAL COURTS
The discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure' per-
mit civil litigants in federal court to find out both the factual basis of an
opponent's case and pertinent data in an opponent's hands that may lead
to evidence supportive of their case. These provisions authorize an ex-
tremely broad approach to discovery, allowing a party to discover any
matter that is relevant to the subject matter of the suit regardless of
whether the matter relates to the party's own claim or defense or to that of
his opponent.2 The rules enable the parties to identify and refine the issues
of their controversy. Consequently, litigants should be able to reach a just
disposition of their action quickly and inexpensively, whether by settle-
ment or adjudication.3
But the extensive scope of the discovery rules renders them vulnerable to
abuse by the parties. Overbroad discovery requests can be designed pri-
marily to harass opponents by forcing them to expend considerable time
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37. These rules provide for discovery through oral or written
depositions, written interrogatories, production of documents and things, physical and
mental examinations, and requests for admission. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a). See notes 28-34
infra.
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). See, e.g., Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S.
340, 351 (1978); Stevenson v. Melady, I F.R.D. 329, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
The rules, however, do not allow for discovery of privileged material. FED. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(1). The term "privileged" in Rule 26(b)(1) refers to those privileges available in the
law of evidence. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6 (1953). See FED. R. EVID. 501
("[I1n civil actions and proceedings ... the privilege of a witness, person, government,
State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law").
See also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511-12 (1947) (memoranda, statements, and
mental impressions prepared, or obtained from interviews with witnesses, by counsel in pre-
paring for litigation are privileged materials immune from discovery).
Although the discovery rules apply to the United States government in civil actions,
United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681 (1958), the government enjoys
unique privileges exempting it from compliance with certain discovery requests. See, e.g.,
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. i (1953) (discovery requests in Federal Torts Claim Act
suit denied where requested material dealt with military secrets). See generally Note, Prefer-
ential Treatment of the United States Under Federal Civil Discovery Procedures, 13 GA. L.
REV. 550 (1979).
3. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1. See also Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 114-15
(1964); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947).
Catholic University Law Review
and money complying with unnecessary requests.4 Conversely, a litigant's
failure to comply fully and promptly with legitimate discovery requests
can result in an opponent's inability to obtain information otherwise right-
fully discoverable under the rules.' These abuses have fostered cries for
reform of the discovery rules, and several such proposals have been intro-
duced.6
This Comment will not analyze the merits of these proposals. It is sub-
mitted here that the rules themselves contain devices that should suffice to
prevent discovery abuses. Rule 26(c), 7 for example, permits district courts
to enter orders protecting litigants from the harassment of overbroad dis-
covery. Rule 378 permits the imposition of sanctions upon parties who fail
to comply with discovery requests. Used properly, these built-in safe-
guards are sufficient to prevent abuse. Moreover, unlike suggested re-
forms, these rules suit the modern purpose of discovery and of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure to produce the just and efficient disposition of
cases in federal courts.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE "BROAD AND LIBERAL TREATMENT" OF
THE DISCOVERY RULES
In 1934, Congress enacted the Rulemaking Statute,9 giving the Supreme
Court "the power to prescribe, by general rules, for the district courts of
the United States . . .the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions,
and the practice and procedure in civil actions at law."'" The statute also
permitted the Court to "unite the general rules prescribed by it for cases in
equity with those in actions at law so as to secure one form of civil action
and procedure for both.""l Pursuant to this power, the Court adopted the
4. See, e.g., Global Maritime Leasing Panama, Inc. v. M/S North Breeze, 451 F. Supp.
965 (D.R.I. 1978); In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 74 F.R.D. 497 (S.D. Cal. 1975).
5. See, e.g., National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639
(1976); Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 602 F.2d 1062
(2d Cir. 1979).
6. See generally ABA Proposed Rules, reprinted in Schroeder & Frank, The Proposed
Changes in the Discovery Rules, 1978 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 475, 506-21 apps; Cohn, Federal Discov-
ery. A Survey of Local Rules and Practices in View of Proposed Changes to the Federal Rules,
63 MINN. L. REV. 253 (1979); Kaminsky, Proposed Federal Disco very Rulesfor Complex Civil
Litigation, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 907 (1980). See generally FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,
SURVEY OF LITERATURE ON DISCOVERY FROM 1970 TO THE PRESENT: EXPRESSED DISSAT-
ISFACTIONS AND PROPOSED REFORMS (1978).
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c), quoted in text accompanying note 61 infra.
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 37. See notes 119-26 and accompanying text infra.
9. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, §§ 1, 2, 48 Stat. 1064 (formerly codified in 28 U.S.C.
§§ 723b, 723c (1934)).
10. Id. § 1.
11. Id § 2. At the time, procedure in equity was governed by the Equity Rules of 1912,
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,' 2 which became effective on September
16, 1938.13
The rules thus merged actions at law and actions in equity into one form
of action known as a "civil action."' 4 This merger did not, however, abol-
ish the differences between legal and equitable rights and remedies; rather,
it abolished the procedural differences between bringing an action at law
and one in equity. 5 The rules were designed to eliminate the procedural
Fed. Eq. R. 1-81, 226 U.S. 627 (1912), promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to the
Act of August 23, 1842, ch. 188, § 6, 5 Stat. 518 (formerly codified in 28 U.S.C. § 730 (1934)).
Procedure in actions at law, however, varied considerably from district to district due to the
command of the Conformity Act that procedure in all civil cases in federal district courts
other than equity and admiralty proceedings "conform, as near as may be, to the... modes
of proceeding existing at the time in like causes in the courts . . . of the State within which
such district courts are held, any rule of court to the contrary notwithstanding." Conformity
Act, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 197 (formerly codified in 28 U.S.C. § 724 (1934)). See, e.g., Quirk
v. Bank of Commerce & Trust Co., 244 F. 682 (6th Cir. 1917); Martin v. Zurich Gen. Acci-
dent & Liab. Ins. Co., 16 F. Supp. 897 (D.R.I. 1936).
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 1-86. The original Rules are found at 308 U.S. 653 (1939).
13. See 2 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1.03[1] n.4 (2d ed. 1979). See also FED. R.
Civ. P.86(a).
14. This concept is embodied in Rule 2: "There shall be one form of action to be
known as a 'civil action.'" FED. R. Civ. P. 2. See also FED. R. Civ. P. i: "These rules
govern the procedure in the United States district courts in all suits of a civil nature whether
cognizable as cases at law or in equity .... "
The obvious effect of Rule 1, coupled with the Rulemaking Statute's command that "all
laws in conflict [with the Rules] shall be of no further force and effect," Act of June 19, 1934,
ch. 65 1, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064, was to supersede both the Equity Rules of 1912 and the Conform-
ity Act, discussed supra, at note II. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941) (a party
has a right to an order compelling physical examination under Rule 35 notwithstanding
state practice to the contrary since the rules supersede the Conformity Act). See also Dobie,
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 VA. L. REV. 261, 262 (1939); Sunderland, The New
Federal Rules, 45 W. VA. L.Q. 5 (1938).
The Conformity Act and the Act of 1842 allowing the Court to promulgate equity rules,
along with the Rulemaking Statute, were officially repealed in the 1948 revision of the Judi-
cial Code, ch. 646, §§ 1-2906, 62 Stat. 869 (1948). The Rulemaking Statute was replaced,
without substantial change, by the Rules Enabling Act, ch. 646, § 2072, 62 Stat. 961 (1949)
(current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976)).
15. Fleming v. Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co., 38 F. Supp. 1001, 1002 (W.D. La. 1941);
Williams v. Collier, 32 F. Supp. 321, 323 (E.D. Pa. 1940). See generall, 2 MOORE'S FED-
ERAL PRACTICE 1 2.02[11] (2d ed. 1979).
It is well beyond the scope of this comment to discuss those types of cases which warrant
treatment of law and those which are to be decided on equitable principles with the attend-
ant and traditional equitable remedies. Stated simply, however, actions at law generally
include a claim for damages, either in the form of money or property, whereas actions in
equity seek a personal command against the defendant requiring him to pursue, or prohibit-
ing him from pursuing, a particular course of action. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 53 1,
538 n.10 (1970). See generally F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 21 (1965); 5 MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE $ 38.11[5,6] (2d ed. 1979). The important distinction remains, however, that in an
action at law either party has a right to trial by jury, while this right generally is not avail-
able in an equitable action. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In suits at common law, where
19811
Catholic University Law Review
"booby-traps" that could, under common law pleading, prevent unwary
and unsophisticated litigants from ever having their day in court.' 6 Proba-
bly the most common technical obstacle that undermined a party's attempt
to have his claim adjudicated on the merits was the meticulous "code
pleading" requirement that a plaintiff "state facts constituting a cause of
action" lest his complaint be dismissed.' 7 This practice under state codes
was followed in federal courts in actions at law'8 and often resulted in the
dismissal of a meritorious claim because the plaintiff failed to clear the
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be pre-
served.") Cf. Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Kleenize Chem. Corp., 194 F. Supp. 876, 879 (N.D.
Ga. 1961) (the right to trial by jury does not extend to cases in equity). Section 2 of the
Rulemaking Statute provided that "in such union of the law and equity rules the right of
trial by jury as at common law and declared by the seventh amendment to the Constitution
shall be preserved to the parties inviolate." Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, § 2, 48 Stat. 1064.
Rule 38(a) reiterates this sentiment, and Rule 38(b) allows a party to demand a trial by jury
only on any issues triable of right by a jury. FED. R. Civ. P. 38(a), (b).
In addition to providing that the Supreme Court could not promulgate rules limiting liti-
gants' seventh amendment right to trial by jury in actions at law, the Rulemaking Statute
dictated that the rules promulgated by the Court "shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify
the substantive rights of any litigant ...." Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064.
Rule 1, which outlines the scope of the Rules, accomplishes this by stating that "[tihese rules
govern. . . procedure .. " FED. R. Civ. P. 1. Cf. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
16. One commentator, a member of the original Advisory Committee to the Supreme
Court on the promulgation of the Rules, stated:
The purpose which [the Rules seek] to accomplish is to eliminate technical matters
by removing the basis for technical objections, to make it as difficult as impossible
[sic] for cases to go off on procedural points, and to make litigation as inexpensive,
as practicable and as convenient, as can be done.
Sunderland, The New Federal Rules, 45 W. VA. L.Q. 5, 30 (1938). See also Surowitz v.
Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 373 (1966) ("If rules of procedure work as they should in
an honest and fair judicial system, they not only permit, but should nearly as possible guar-
antee, that bona fide complaints be carried to an adjudication on the merits.")
17. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 426 (Deering) (1909); Mo. REV. STAT. § 1794
(1909); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-122 (1953) (repealed 1970). See generally Cook, Statements of
Fact in Pleading under the Codes, 21 COLUM. L. REV. 416 (1921).
The cardinal requirement of such code pleading statutes was that the plaintiff set out facts
constituting a cause of action, not the plaintiff's legal conclusions. A cause of action con-
sisted of facts, whereas legal conclusions were assumed to be known to the parties and the
court and were therefore worthless in the absence of facts to which they could be applied.
See, e.g., Stivers v. Baker, 87 Ky. 508, 9 S.W. 491, 492 (1888):
A statement of facts constituting a cause of action is not only necessary to enable
the opposite party to form an issue, and to inform him of what his adversary in-
tends to prove, but to enable the court to declare the law upon the facts stated. It
cannot do so if a mere legal conclusion is stated.
See also Gillespie v. Goodyear Serv. Stores, 258 N.C. 487, 128 S.E.2d 762 (1963); POMEROY,
CODE REMEDIES 560-61 (4th ed. 1904), quoted in Cook, supra, at 417 n. 1!.
18. See note I I supra. Cf. Fed. Eq. R. 25, 226 U.S. 655 (1912) ("[A] bill in equity shall
contain . . . a short and simple statement of the ultimate facts upon which the plaintiff asks
relief, omitting any mere statement of evidence.")
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initial hurdle of stating facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.' 9
The implementation of the rules, however, operated to remove the pro-
cedural difficulties that arose under code pleading. For example, instead
of requiring a statement of facts constituting a cause of action, the rules
demand only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief."2° The differences between the two pleading
systems were clarified by the Supreme Court in Conley v. Gibson.*2 In that
case, the plaintiff-petitioners brought suit in federal district court alleging
that the respondents had discriminated against them in violation of the
Railway Labor Act.22 The respondents argued that because the complaint
did not set forth specific facts to support its general allegations of discrimi-
nation, the action should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. 23 The Supreme Court disagreed, saying the
Rules do not require a party to set out in detail the facts upon which he
bases his claim: all that is required under Rule 8(a)(2) is "a short and
plain statement of the claim" giving the defendant fair notice of the sub-
stance and basis of the plaintiffs claim. 24 Following the rule 8(f) guide
that "all pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice, 25 the
Court found that the petitioners' complaint adequately set forth a claim
and gave the respondents fair notice of its basis. 26 The Court added: "The
Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which
one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the
principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on
19. An example of rigid adherence to code pleading can be found in Lyons v. Reinecke,
10 F.2d 3 (7th Cir. 1925). In that case the plaintiff sued the Collector of Internal Revenue to
recover taxes paid under protest on the ground that he was exempt from such payment. The
district court dismissed the suit for failure to state facts constituting a cause of action. The
Seventh Circuit affirmed, saying the pleadings were so indefinite and uncertain that they
failed to show what work the plaintiff was employed to do, what work he in fact did, or
whether his employment was such as to bring him within the exemption under considera-
tion. 1d at 7. See also Jack v. Armour & Co., 291 F. 741, 745 (8th Cir. 1923) (antitrust
action dismissed where allegation that plaintiff was injured by defendant's conduct was un-
supported by facts showing the manner or extent of the injury and was insufficient to state a
cause of action).
20. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
21. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
22. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1976).
23. Rule 12(b)(6) allows a party to move to dismiss his opponent's claim for "failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted." FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
24. 355 U.S. at 47.
25. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(f). Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 1: The rules "shall be construed to secure
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."
26. 355 U.S. at 48.
1981]
Catholic University Law Review
the merits. '"27
"Notice pleading" alone, however, fails to inform the opposing party or
the court of the precise matters to be adjudicated at trial. The discovery
provisions of the rules are designed to accomplish that. Rule 26(a) 28 pro-
vides that parties may obtain discovery by one or more of the following
methods: depositions upon oral examination or written questions, writ-
ten interrogatories, 3 production of documents or things or permission to
enter upon land, 32 physical and mental examinations, 33 and requests for
admissions.34 Use of these devices represents a significant change from
discovery practices available in federal court prior to 1938." 5 Their pur-
27. Id See also Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d 389, 393 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1143 (1974); Dearman v. Woodson, 429 F.2d 1288, 1289 (10th Cir. 1970).
28. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a).
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a) provides: "After commencement of the action, any party may
take the testimony of any person, including a party, by deposition upon oral examination."
Leave of the court is generally not required. Id
30. FED. R. Civ. P. 3 1(a) provides: "After commencement of the action, any party may
take the testimony of any person, including a party, by deposition upon written questions."
The use of both oral and written depositions in court is outlined in Rule 32. See, e.g.,
Salsman v. Witt, 466 F.2d 76, 79 (10th Cir. 1972) (testimony by deposition is less desirable
than oral testimony and should ordinarily be used as a substitute only if the witness is un-
available to testify in person).
31. FED. R. Civ. P. 33(a) provides: "Any party may serve upon any other party written
interrogatories to be answered by the party served . . . who shall furnish such information
as is available to the party."
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a) provides:
Any party may serve on any other party a request (I) to produce and permit the
party making the request. . . to inspect and copy, any designated documents ... ,
or to inspect and copy, test, or sample any tangible things . . . which are in the
possession, custody, or control of the party upon whom the request is served; or (2)
to permit entry upon designated land or other property in the possession or control
of the party upon whom the request is served for the purpose of inspection and
measuring, surveying, photographing, testing, or sampling the property or any des-
ignated object or operation thereon. ...
33. FED. R. Civ. P. 35(a) provides: "When the mental or physical condition ... of a
party . . . is in controversy, the court in which the action is pending may order the party to
submit to a physical or mental examination by a physician . . . . The order may be made
only on motion for good cause shown ..
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 36(a) provides:
A party may serve upon any other party a written request for the admission, for
purposes of the pending action only, of the truth of any matters. . . set forth in the
request that relate to statements or opinions of fact or of the application of law to
fact, including the genuineness of any documents described in the request.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 36(b): "Any matter admitted under this rule is conclusively established
unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission."
35. Prior to 1938, the discovery devices available in actions at law were contained in
chapter 17 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-738 (1934). The discovery provisions of
the Federal Rules superseded those sections governing discovery in 1938 and chapter 17 was
repealed in its entirety in 1948. See note 14 supra. There were limited provisions for deposi-
[Vol. 30:273
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pose is to allow the parties to ascertain the facts relevant to the claims
raised in the pleadings, thereby narrowing and clarifying the basic issues
so that civil trials in federal court need not be carried on "in the dark."
36
The availability of discovery under Rules 26 through 37 thus vitiates the
argument that the notice-pleading provisions of the rules fail to inform the
parties and the court as to the precise bounds of the subject matter being
litigated. The relevant facts and the resulting formation of the scope of the
subject matter at issue are still revealed before trial. The difference be-
tween practice under code pleading and the present system, however, is
that the latter allows the facts and issues to be developed in a manner more
conducive to effectuating just results. 37 The plaintiff will not suffer dismis-
sal of a meritorious claim for failing to recite all the facts necessary to
constitute a cause of action, but rather, with the sanction of the rules, is
afforded time and the tools to uncover facts necesary to sustain his action.
In order to be effective, however, the scope of discovery must necessarily
be broad. Rule 26(b)(1) provides that litigants "may obtain discovery re-
garding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter
involved in the pending action," whether such matters relate to the claim
or to the defense of any party, including the identity and location of "per-
tions, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 639-646 (1934), but there was no authority upon which a party could
base a demand for interrogatories, production of documents, or physical examinations. See,
e.g., National Cash-Register Co. v. Leland, 94 F. 502, 505 (Ist Cir. 1899) (the taking of
depositions in a manner not authorized by federal statute is not allowable nor may a party
obtain proof by interrogatories addressed to the other party in an action at law). See also
Fed. Eq. R. 47, 226 U.S. 661 (1912); Fed. Eq. R. 58, 226 U.S. 665 (1912).
36. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 114-15 (1964); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S.
495, 501 (1947). See also United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958)
(the discovery rules "make a trial less a game of blindman's bluff and more a fair contest
with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent"); Carlson Compa-
nies, Inc. v. Sperry and Hutchinson Co., 374 F. Supp. 1080, 1100 (D. Minn. 1974) (purpose
of the discovery rules is to clarify and confine the issues to be litigated and to reveal to the
parties and the court the existence or whereabouts of facts relevant to those issues). See
generally C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, 8 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2001 (1970);
Kaminsky, Proposed Federal Discovery Rulesfor Complex Civil Litigation, 48 FORDHAM L.
REV. 907, 908 (1980); Pike & Willis, The New Federal Deposition-Discovery Procedure, 38
COLUM. L. REV. 1179 (1938).
37. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957) (the "simplified 'notice pleading'
[of Rule 8(a)(2)] is made possible by the liberal opportunity for discovery and other pretrial
procedures established by the rules to disclose more precisely the basis of both claim and
defense and to define more narrowly the disputed facts and issues"). The Rules engendered
this interpretation from the beginning. See, e.g., Coca Cola v. Dixi-Cola Laboratories, Inc.,
30 F. Supp. 275, 277 (D. Md. 1939) (purpose of the new rules was to require simplicity and
brevity in the pleadings, but with ample provisions for discovery of facts before trial, in
order to prevent surprise at trial and possible miscarriage of justice). See also Mahon v.
Bennett, 6 F.R.D. 213, 214 (W.D. Mo. 1946); New England Terminal Co. v. Graver Tank &
Mfg. Corp., 1 F.R.D. 411, 413 (D.R.I. 1940).
19811
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sons having knowledge of any discoverable matter."38 The courts have
consistently read this relevancy requirement liberally. Indeed, the
Supreme Court stated recently:
The key phrase in this definition-"relevant to the subject matter
involved in the pending action"-has been construed broadly to
encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could
lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may
be in the case. . . .Consistently with the notice-pleading system
established by the Rules, discovery is not limited to issues raised
by the pleadings, for discovery itself is designed to help define
and clarify the issues. . . .Nor is discovery limited to the merits
of a case, for a variety of fact-oriented issues may arise during
litigation that are not related to the merits.39
The broad scope of discovery is necessary both to ensure that the parties
know all the relevant facts and to secure the "just, speedy, and inexpensive
38. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added). Rule 26(b)(1) also provides: "It is not
ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at trial if the informa-
tion sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."
Id See, e.g., Burns v. Thiokol Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 300, 304 n.8 (5th Cir. 1973); Freeman
v. Seligson, 405 F.2d 1326, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1968). See also FED. R. CIv. P. 33(b) ("Interrog-
atories may relate to any matter which can be inquired into under Rule 26(b) ...."); FED.
R. Civ. P. 34(a) (any party may obtain discovery, by use of production of documents and
things and entry upon land for inspection and other purposes, of any matters "within the
scope of Rule 26(b)"); FED. R. Civ. P. 36(a) (requests for admission may be made of the
truth of any matters "within the scope of Rule 26(b)").
39. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978) (citations and foot-
note omitted). See also Stevenson v. Melady, I F.R.D. 329, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
In a footnote to the material quoted in the text the Oppenheimer opinion went on to say:
"For example, where issues arise as to jurisdiction or venue, discovery is available to ascer-
tain the facts bearing on such issues." 437 U.S. at 351 n.13. See, e.g., Investment Properties
Int'l, Ltd. v. IOS, Ltd., 459 F.2d 705, 708 (2d Cir. 1972). See generally 8 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2009 n.34 (1970); Note, The Use of Discov-
ery to Obtain Jurisdictional Facts, 59 VA. L. REV. 533 (1973).
The cases indicate that relevancy is to be accorded a broad and liberal interpretation,
allowing discovery of any information that may lead to admissible evidence. See, e.g.,
Miller v. Doctor's Gen. Hosp., 76 F.R.D. 136, 138-39 (W.D. Okla. 1977); Smith v. FTC, 403
F. Supp. 1000, 1013 (D. Del. 1975). One district court has gone so far as to say that discov-
ery "requires the disclosure of material which may be neither relevant nor admissible at trial,
since it may lead to the discovery of relevant evidence." Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 428
F. Supp. 200, 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (emphasis added).
This broad treatment of relevance was further expanded in 1970 when Rule 34 was
amended by deleting the showing of good cause required for requests for production of
documents and things, incorporating instead the general relevance standard of Rule
26(b)(1). Compare Verrazzano Trading Corp. v. United States, 349 F. Supp. 1401 (Cust. Ct.
1972) and FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a) with Guilford Nat'l Bank of Greensboro v. Southern Ry.,
297 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1962) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 34, 308 U.S. 707 (1939) (rule no longer in
force).
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determination of every action."4 ° The time-honored cry of "fishing expe-
dition" cannot operate to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts
underlying his opponent's case; the discovery provisions simply advance
the stage at which disclosure can be compelled from the time of trial to the
period preceding it, thus reducing the possibility of surprise.4'
Like all other matters of procedure, discovery has ultimate and neces-
sary boundaries.4" Recently, in Herbert v. Lando, the Supreme Court
pointed out that the Rule 1 directive that the rules "be construed to secure
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action" requires
that the Rule 26(b)(1) relevance standard be firmly applied. The Court
warned that district courts should not neglect their power to restrict or
limit discovery whenever justice requires protection for a party or person
from "annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or ex-
pense .... "4' Although the courts enforce the relevancy requirement of
40. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
41. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947). See, e.g., Shelak v. White Motor Co.,
581 F.2d 1155, 1159 (5th Cir. 1978) (reversible error where plaintiff failed to reveal his claim
of injury precipitating a heart attack in view of defendant's prior interrogatory requesting
information on all "parts of the plaintiff's body" claimed to have been injured as a result of
an accident involving defendant's truck); Stark v. Photo Researchers, Inc., 77 F.R.D. 18, 20
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (discovery is designed to accomplish full disclosure of the facts, eliminate
surprise, and promote settlement). See alsoFED. R. Civ. P. 26(e):
A party who has responded to a request for discovery with a response that was
complete when made is under no duty to supplement his response to include infor-
mation thereafter required, except as follows:
(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response if he obtains
information upon the basis of which (A) he knows that the response was incorrect
when made, or (B) he knows that the response though correct when made is no
longer true and the circumstances are such that a failure to amend the response is
in substance a knowing concealment.
That a request for discovery might be interpreted as a "fishing expedition" does not allow
a party to escape compliance with this request. See Banco Nacional de Credito v. Bank of
America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, I I F.R.D. 497, 498-99 (N.D. Cal. 1951); Bergstrom Paper
Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 7 F.R.D. 548, 550 (E.D. Wis. 1947); Laverett v. Continental
Briar Pipe Co., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 80, 82 (E.D.N.Y. 1938). But see Schweinert v. Insurance
Co. of North America, I F.R.D. 247, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
42. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978). See Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
43. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)). See
notes 61-119 and accompanying text infra.
In Herbert, the Court held that a journalist's thoughts, opinions, and conclusions were
discoverable by a "public figure" libel plaintiff in spite of the first amendment's guarantee of
freedom of the press where that matter would produce evidence material to the proof of a
critical element of the plaintiffs cause of action. Cf. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964). Thus, the Court's admonition that the relevance standard be firmly applied
was dictum, but it is representative of the Court's belief that discovery has necessary bounds
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Rule 26(b)(1) where it is obvious that the requested matters cannot possi-
bly lead to admissible evidence," the scope of discovery remains broad,
notwithstanding the Supreme Court's caveat.
The broad scope of discovery is perhaps the major contributing factor to
its abuse. Coupled with the fact that the discovery rules are to be utilized
with minimal intervention by the courts,45 the broad scope of discovery
creates a situation in which counsel operate in an important area of pre-
trial procedure with largely unfettered discretion. This independence of
counsel in the discovery area, however, serves to accentuate the dual role
of the attorney in an adversary system: an attorney is torn between his
obligation to seek ultimate justice in his capacity as an officer of the court
and his obligation to his client, "to whom the desire for triumph is para-
mount even at justice's expense."46
It is in the interest of the party opposing a discovery request to utilize
whatever tactics are available so as to cause delay or extra expense to the
opponent. Conversely, it is often in the interest of the party requesting
discovery to make discovery so expensive that a good settlement seems
cheap by comparison.47 The broad scope of the discovery rules, the lim-
ited judicial supervision of the process, and the importance of discovery in
which must be respected in order to prevent discovery abuse. See also Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975).
44. See, e.g., American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 447 F.2d 680 (7th Cir.
1971) (trial court properly sustained objections to plaintiffs interrogatories asking for evi-
dence of other roof collapses as that had no bearing on cause of plaintiffs roof collapse);
Wood v. McCullough, 45 F.R.D. 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (objections to plaintiffs interrogatories
sustained because evidence of other legal proceedings against physician-defendants was ir-
relevant to the plaintiffs malpractice issues in the case at hand).
45. Harlem River Consumers Coop. v. Associated Grocers of Harlem, Inc., 54 F.R.D.
551, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). SeeAdvisory Committee Notes to 1970 Amendments to Rule 34,
28 U.S.C. 457 app. (1976) ("Rule 34 is revised [by deleting the 'good cause' requirement
from requests for production of documents and things] to accomplish the following major
changes in the existing rule; . . .(2) to have the rule operate extrajudicially"). Cf. Manual
for Complex Litigation § 1.10 (1978); Kaufman, Judicial Control Over Discovery, 28 F.R.D.
111, 116-17 (1962).
46. Cohn, supra note 6, at 255-56 n.25. Conpare ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY EC 7-4 (1978) ("The advocate may urge any permissible construction of the
law favorable to his client, without regard to his professional opinion as to the likelihood
that the construction will ultimately prevail") with id EC 7-25 ("[W]hile a lawyer may take
steps in good faith and within the framework of the law to test the validity of rules, he is not
justified in consciously violating such rules and he should be diligent in his efforts to guard
against his unintentional violation of them"). See also id DR 7-102(A) ("A lawyer shall not
suppress any evidence that he or his client has a legal obligation to reveal or produce.")
47. Cohn, supra note 6, at 255-56 n.25. See also Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 48 U.S.L.W. 4497, 4500 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("Persons or busi-
nesses of comparatively limited means settle unjust claims and relinquish just claims simply
because they cannot afford to litigate").
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a particular case thus afford ample opportunity and incentive to abuse dis-
covery.
Moreover, in complex civil litigation, where the issues, the potential evi-
dence, and, accordingly, the scope of discovery are extremely broad, the
potential for abuse of discovery is that much greater. 8 Difficulties emerge
in complex litigation because of the large number of documents and wit-
nesses typically involved, requiring massive review of papers, meticulous
attention to administrative detail, frequent travel, and the examination and
reexamination of witnesses by several counsel.4 9 The number of docu-
ments accumulated from extensive discovery in a complex case and the
resulting costs are enormous.5° Many matters in complex cases fall within
the relevance standard the courts have applied under Rule 26(b)(1). 5 For
example, in United States v. IBM,52 part of the Government's celebrated
antitrust case against IBM, the Government moved for an order compel-
ling discovery pursuant to Rule 37.53 IBM countered by moving for a
Rule 26(c)54 protective order limiting discovery, requesting that the depo-
sitions of IBM witnesses be limited to material relevant to the subject mat-
ter of the action. The district court granted the Government's order
compelling discovery and refused to grant the protective order, in whole or
in part, ruling that any matter requested is relevant, and therefore discov-
erable, "where there is any possibility that the information sought may be
relevant to the subject matter of the action."55 The court issued the follow-
ing general instructions to the parties: "All objections to requests for dis-
covery predicated on the ground that the item or answer sought is
irrelevant to the subject matter of this action are to be noted, but the item
48. Complex litigation often arises in the following areas: antitrust; class actions; cases
involving requests for injunctive relief affecting the operations of a large business entity;
common disaster cases, such as those arising from aircraft crashes; stockholder derivative
actions. See Manual for Complex Litigation § 0.22 (1978).
49. Kaminsky, supra note 6, at 909 n. 11; Kirkham, Problems of Complex Civil Litiga-
tion, 83 F.R.D. 497, 505-08 (1980).
50. One example is Control Data Corporation's expenditure of $12,000,000 to obtain
and another $3,000,000 to computerize documents before trial in its private antitrust case
against IBM. S. REP. No. 498, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1975). See also In re IBM Antitrust
Litigation, 328 F. Supp. 509, 510 (J.P.M.D.L. 1971), wherein the Judicial Panel on Multidis-
trict Litigation stated that Control Data's action against IBM would result in the production
of hundreds of millions of documents and that discovery would take several years.
5 1. See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
52. 66 F.R.D. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
53. FED. R. Civ. P. 37. See notes 119-59 and accompanying text infra.
54. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). See notes 61-118 and accompanying text infra.
55. 66 F.R.D. at 185 (quoting C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 359 n.47 (2d ed.
1970)) (emphasis in original).
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sought or answer requested shall be given."56 The order compelling dis-
covery was issued in 1974. In fiscal year 1975, transcripts and travel costs
accrued by the Justice Department's Antitrust Division, in the IBM case
alone, amounted to $500,000. 7 The total cost of the case, as of 1975, was
$4,000,000, and the case has yet to come to trial six years later.58
The IBM case is noted here not because it is representative of cases in
which discovery abuse occurs, but because it is representative of the scale
of discovery in a complex case.59 The relevance standard, as applied by
the courts, allows a party to request vast amounts of information via depo-
sitions, interrogatories, and requests for production of documents. The
power to acquire such information carries with it the ancillary power to
use discovery merely as a weapon for increasing costs and delaying the
administration of justice to the opposing party, or as a device to support
the mere suspicion of a claim or defense when in fact none exists. Alterna-
tively, a party faced with a discovery request may utilize the process to
obfuscate issues, conceal facts and pertinent documents among irrelevant
material, raise irresponsible objections, or improperly refuse to comply
with legitimate discovery demands.6 ° There exist, however, within the dis-
covery rules themselves, procedures for combatting the abuses of discovery
which plague both litigants and the courts.
II. OVERBROAD DISCOVERY REQUESTS: THE NEED FOR INCREASED
JUDICIAL SUPERVISION
The tools to prevent the abuse of discovery already exist. Rule 26(c)
provides that:
Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery
is sought, andfor good cause shown, the court in which the action
is pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition,
the court in the district where the deposition is to be taken may
make any order which justice requires to protect a party or per-
son from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue bur-
den or expense . . 6
Further, the rule lists the orders the court may make, including, but not
limited to: that discovery not be had, that it be had only on terms and
56. 66 F.R.D. at 186.
57. S. REP. No. 498, 94th Cong., ist Sess. 4 (1975).
58. Id.
59. See also Burns v. Thiokol Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1973).
60. See, e.g., Bell v. Auto Club of Mich., 80 F.R.D. 228 (E.D. Mich. 1978). See gener-
ally Kaminsky, supra note 6, at 910; Pollack, Discovery-Its Abuse and Correction, 80
F.R.D. 219, 222 (1978).
61. FED R. Civ. P. 26(c) (emphasis added).
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conditions set by the court, or that discovery be conducted by a method
other than that selected by the party seeking discovery.62 Rule 26(c) not
only permits a party to move for a protective order but also allows any
person from whom discovery is sought to apply for such an order. 63 The
purpose of the rule is plain on its face: to prevent abuse of the discovery
rules by parties who utilize the process to impose financial and temporal
burdens on their opponents unrelated to the merits of a case in order to
delay or even prevent adjudication or settlement.
A. The "Good Cause" Requirement
The immediate obstacle in obtaining a protective order pursuant to Rule
26(c) is the requirement that the party or person moving for the order show
"good cause" before the order will issue. The courts have insisted that
protective orders will not issue upon general allegations and conclusory
statements asserting that the request will result in significant financial bur-
den. Rather, the courts have required that the determination of whether
good cause exists be based upon appropriate testimony and other factual
data. For example, in Kiblen v. Retail Credit Co., 64 the plaintiff moved for
a protective order to prevent the defendant from discovering evidence re-
lating to its counterclaim of fraud. The district court, without discussing
the grounds upon which the motion was made, refused to grant it, claiming
that a motion for a protective order is a "disfavored motion" requiring a
showing of good cause. Thus, the burden was on the party seeking relief to
show some "plainly adequate reason" for the order.65 The court contin-
ued: "The courts have insisted on a particular and specific demonstration
of fact, as distinguished from conclusory statements, in order to establish
good cause. . . As a disfavored motion, it will be denied if there is any
set of circumstances under which the pleaded affirmative defense of fraud
could succeed."66
62. Id. See, e.g., Fishman v. A. H. Riise Gift Shop, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 704, 705 (D.V.I.
1975) (protective order entered directing party to proceed by way of deposition rather than
by written interrogatories).
Rule 30(d) provides that during the taking of a deposition, on a motion of a party or the
deponent and upon a showing that the deposition "is being conducted in bad faith or in such
a manner as unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress" the party or the deponent, the
court may terminate the deposition or limit the scope or manner of its taking "as provided in
Rule 26(c)." FED. R. Civ. P. 30(d).
63. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). See also Caisson Corp. v. County W. Bldg. Corp., 62 F.R.D.
331, 334 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Monticello Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 12 F.R.D. 344,
345 (S.D.N.Y.), afd, 197 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 875 (1958).
64. 76 F.R.D. 402 (E.D. Wash. 1977).
65. Id. at 404.
66. Id
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Similarly, in Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett,67 the plaintiff corporation sued to
enjoin the Rhode Island Director of Employment Security from distribut-
ing unemployment compensation to its striking employees. The employ-
ees' union intervened as a defendant and sought to depose the plaintiffs
expert witnesses and the plaintiff moved for a protective order. A magis-
trate8 issued the order after finding that the likelihood of harassment was
"more probable than not." On review, the district court reversed the mag-
istrate's order. The court said that a showing that the likelihood of harass-
ment was "more probable than not" was insufficient to warrant issuance of
a protective order absent a concomitant showing that the information
sought was "fully irrelevant and could have no possible bearing on the
issues."6 9 Although the court was hesitant to find error in the magistrate's
conclusion that harassment was in fact one of the purposes for seeking the
particular depositions, it refused to accept the magistrate's finding that the
depositions were not intended to uncover evidence relevant to the litiga-
tion."
When a clear showing of good cause is made courts will issue protective
orders limiting discovery. In Global Maritime Leasing Panama, Inc. v.
M/S North Breeze," the defendants' liability had already been adjudi-
cated and a special master had been appointed to ascertain damages.
Eight months after the master's appointment and just before the parties
were to appear before him, the defendants made lengthy discovery re-
quests. The district court granted the plaintiffs motion for a protective
order, ruling that good cause existed since the defendants' requests, made
for the first time, came almost eight years after commencement of the ac-
tion and the defendants had never before exhibited a need for discovery of
the requested material.72 Further, the court pointed out that the requests
sought materials which might no longer have been in existence and whose
production would have placed the plaintiff in an "unfairly burdensome
position" at a time just prior to the hearing before the master.73
Similarly, a showing of good cause was made in Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne
67. 70 F.R.D. 326 (D.R.I. 1976).
68. On the use of magistrates to preside over discovery motions, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-
639 (1976) and note 117 infra.
69. 70 F.R.D. at 334.
70. Id See also United States v. IBM Corp., 453 F. Supp. 194, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(defendant's motion for a protective order covering twenty-four deponents was denied
where the apprehension of discovery abuse was merely speculative and where the record did
not indicate that the depositions were requested in bad faith).
71. 451 F. Supp. 965 (D.R.I. 1978).
72. Id. at 966.
73. 1d at 967.
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College .7 A teacher brought suit against her former employer alleging
that sex and age discrimination resulted in her mandatory retirement. The
district court entered a protective order prohibiting discovery of the de-
fendant's confidential evaluations of each faculty member. The plaintiff
lost and appealed, asserting that entry of the protective order was errone-
ous. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, noting that the scope of a protective
order lies within the discretion of the trial court and that the order would
be reversed only if there had been an abuse of discretion. 7" The circuit
court pointed out that the college required assurance of confidentiality in
its evaluations to enable it to receive honest and candid appraisals of the
abilities of its faculty members by their peers. As a result, it was necessary
for the district court to balance this legitimate interest of the defendant
against the plaintiffs need for the material. 76 The court went on to say
that if the college had sought to justify any male-female disparity on the
basis of the evaluations, the plaintiff should have been granted the oppor-
tunity to use them to demonstrate that the justification was a mere pretext.
Since the college did not resort to the evaluations for that or any other
purpose at trial, however, and absent a showing by the plaintiff that her
need for the material outweighed the college's countervailing interest in
confidentiality, the district court's protective order did not amount to an
abuse of discretion.77
In addition, unreasonable breadth and excessive expense have some-
times contributed to a showing of good cause. For example, in In re US
74. 552 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1977).
75. Id at 581.
76. Id.
77. Id See also Cooke v. New Mexico Junior College Bd., 579 F.2d 568 (10th Cir.
1978). In Cooke, the plaintiff sued his employer alleging violation of his first amendment
rights stemming from his dismissal as a teacher. After the plaintiff refused to produce copies
of his diary for the time period in issue, the defendants obtained an order compelling him to
do so because part of his recollection of the facts was based on diary entries. The plaintiff
had previously offered to produce copies of entries directly related to the suit, but this did
not satisfy the defendants. The district court later dismissed the plaintiff's action for failure
to comply with its order compelling production. On appeal the Tenth Circuit reversed. Af-
ter discussing the plaintiff's initial offer, the court said:
This, then, is not an instance of stonewalling, and his offer to produce relevant
entries should be amply sufficient to satisfy the defendants in their discovery ef-
forts. Surely the defendants do not want to waste valuable time in reading entries
in [the plaintiff's] diary which are purely personal in nature and in no manner
relate to his dispute with the College. The only possible reason the defendants
would want to inspect and copy non-relevant entries would be to cause embarrass-
ment. Rule 26(c) permits a trial judge to enter protective orders which will protect
a party from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden.
Id. at 570.
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78Financial Securities Litigation, a complex case involving alleged securi-
ties law violations, the defendants served plaintiffs with a set of interroga-
tories two inches high and 381 pages long, containing 2,736 questions. The
cost of answering them was conservatively estimated at $24,000. The dis-
trict court held, sua sponte, that the requests were burdensome and oppres-
sive. It issued an order striking them, granting defendants leave to file
"reasonable" interrogatories calculated to discover important facts rather
than numerous and minor evidentiary details.79 The court recognized that
although unfettered discovery of all materials relevant to the case should
be permitted, and that discovery is not limited to facts admissible at trial,
its use must nonetheless "be tailored to discover only what is reasonable
and necessary to the litigation at hand."8
78. 74 F.R.D. 497 (S.D. Cal. 1975).
79. Id at 498. Although Rule 26(c) requires a protective order to be entered "[ulpon
motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought," the district court's sua
sponte imposition of the order highlights an important but often overlooked power of the
district courts to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases. A court may act
voluntarily without the suggestion of any party, "governed not by rule or statute but by the
control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs .... ." Link v. Wabash
R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962). Although Link was an affirmance of a district court's sua
sponte dismissal for failure to prosecute, one commentator, himself a district court judge,
has suggested that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "were not intended to circumscribe
this essential power, and courts have the authority to deal with litigants and lawyers who
undermine the litigation process that the Federal Rules were intended to facilitate." Ren-
frew, Discovery Sanctions. 4 Judicial Perspective, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 264, 268 (1979). See
also, Dolgow v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. 661, 664 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (while ruling, sua sponte,
that no further discovery would be allowed by either party, the court said that "[a]lthough
caution should be exercised in order not to foreclose any legitimate avenue of inquiry pre-
maturely, where the issues have been explored and sharply defined, the court is competent to
decide what evidence may be of possible relevance.").
80. 74 F.R.D. at 498. Indiscriminate use of large numbers of written interrogatories has
prompted several district courts to restrict their availability. Rule 83 provides in part:
"Each district court by action of a majority of the judges thereof may from time to time
make and amend rules governing its practice not inconsistent with these rules." FED. R. Civ.
P. 83 (emphasis added). Pursuant to this power, at least two district courts have promul-
gated rules limiting the number of interrogatories a party may serve on another party. See,
e.g., M.D. FLA. GEN. R. 3.03(a) (unless permitted for "cause shown" no party shall serve
more than 50 interrogatories); N.D. ILL. GEN. R. 9(g) (no party shall serve more than twenty
interrogatories without establishing "good cause" for more).
Rule 33, however, does not limit the number of interrogatories a party may serve. FED. R.
Civ. P. 33. The only restriction upon interrogatories is that they "relate to ...matters
which can be inquired into under Rule 26(b) .. " FED. R. Civ. P. 33(b). It remains to be
seen whether such local rules as those in the Northern District of Illinois and the Middle
District of Florida are invalid as inconsistent with the Federal Rules. On the other hand,
they do not limit the scope of discovery, but merely the manner in which discovery is made,
and they may be amenable to interpretation as a sort of standing 'quasi-protective' order
that interrogatories be of limited length or that discovery may be had only by a method
other than written interrogatories absent circumstances warranting the use of more than the
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Nonetheless, motions for protective orders are disfavored and courts re-
quire a moving party to make a strong showing of good cause before a
protective order will issue. This is not surprising since Rule 26(c) does not
protect a party or person from burdensome or expensive discovery re-
quests, but rather is designed to protect a party from discovery requests
that foster undue burden or expense. Thus, the determination of whether
compliance with a discovery request would involve undue burden or ex-
pense depends upon whether the party requesting the order can show that
the need for protection outweighs the need for discovery. Consequently,
the courts employ a balancing test to determine the need for a protective
order.
B. Good Cause v. Relevance.- Tipping the Scale in Favor of Discovery
The decision to issue or deny a protective order requires a detailed re-
view by the trial court of the importance of the material sought and the
burden accompanying its production. The problem facing the courts is
how to permit a litigant to obtain the information necessary to prepare
adequately for the issues that may develop, without imposing a prohibitive
and unjust burden of information gathering on his adversary. Accordingly,
in considering a request for a protective order, a court must balance one
party's interest in protection from burdensome and expensive discovery
requests against another party's need for the material. The courts must
also allow discovery broad enough to guarantee the expeditious and fair
determination of every action.
In Richards of Rockford, Inc. v. Pacflc Gas & Electric Co. ,81 the court
used such a balancing test and refused to compel a non-party to produce
documents the plaintiff had requested. The documents, prepared for the
defendant, were not made in preparation for trial but were based on inter-
views with the defendant's employees and related to equipment that was
the subject of the plaintiffs contract action. In denying the plaintiffs mo-
tion to compel production of the interview transcripts, the district court
noted its responsibility to balance the interests of the defendant in ob-
taining the information against the costs of providing it.82 The court found
that the costs of compelling discovery far outweighed the plaintiff's as-
serted interest in the information sought. The court explained that the pro-
ceeding was civil rather than criminal, that the person from whom the
specified number. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(3). See also Schroeder & Frank, supra note 6, at
486-87.
81. 71 F.R.D. 388 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
82. Id at 389.
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material was requested was not a party, that the information in question
was available from other sources, and that the information sought did not
go to the heart of the plaintiffs claim or defense.83
Although the Richards court found the availability of the requested in-
formation from independent sources to be important,84 this factor was un-
persuasive to the court in Blankenship v. Hearst Co. ,85 an antitrust action
against a newspaper. During discovery, the district court entered a protec-
tive order preventing the plaintiff from deposing the newspaper's publisher
because the information to be elicited from him had already been gathered
from other sources. The court later granted summary judgment in favor of
the defendants. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed. The court said that
under the liberal discovery principles of the Federal Rules the defendants
had to carry a heavy burden in showing why discovery should be denied.
The defendants failed to do so, in part because the plaintiff had suggested
that the newspaper's publisher had information the other deponents did
not. 86 The court directed that, on remand, in the absence of a better show-
ing by the defendant that its publisher did not have any unique knowledge
regarding the case, the plaintiff should be permitted to proceed with his
deposition.87 Similarly, in Anderson v. Air West, Inc. ," the late Howard
Hughes was unsuccessful in obtaining a protective order preventing his
deposition by the plaintiffs in a suit alleging securities law violations.
Hughes claimed that he had no knowledge of the transactions at issue.
The district court, however, found that Hughes "probably had some
knowledge" of the transactions and refused to issue the requested order.
On review, the Ninth Circuit considered the finding to be supported by the
record.89
In both Blankenship and Anderson the courts found a shred of evidence
83. Id. at 390-91. See also Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 783 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973).
84. Richards of Rockford, Inc. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 71 F.R.D. at 390.
85. 519 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1975).
86. Id at 429.
87. Id. See also NAACP, Western Region v. Hodgson, 57 F.R.D. 81, 83 (D.D.C. 1972)
(a protective order will not issue where it would result in denying one party access to proof
necessary to withstand summary judgment).
88. 542 F.2d 1090 (9th Cir. 1976).
89. Id at 1092-93. See also Amherst Leasing Corp. v. Emhart Corp., 65 F.R.D. 121,
123 (D. Conn. 1974) (plaintiffs' motion for protective order against taking the deposition of
their controlling stockholder on ground that he had no knowledge of the transactions at
issue denied); Overseas Exch. Corp. v. Inwood Motors, Inc., 20 F.R.D. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1956)
(conclusory affidavits that defendant's officers do not have knowledge of the case are not
grounds for issuance of protective order). But see Salter v. Upjohn Co., 593 F.2d 649, 651
(5th Cir. 1979) (where the defendant's president had given substantially the same testimony
in a Senate committee hearing, and had directed the plaintiff to persons with more direct
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that the reluctant deponents had information relevant to the cause of ac-
tion. Therefore, under the relevance standard enunciated in Rule 26(b)(1),
and as interpreted by the courts, 9° their information was discoverable
notwithstanding their claim that they had no knowledge relating to the
action, or that others had "better" knowledge. Thus, in ruling on motions
for protective orders, consideration of whether the requested material is
relevant pervades the balancing test and is often the determinative factor
in deciding whether to issue a protective order.
For example, in Burns v. Thiokol Chemical Corp. ,9 the plaintiffs
brought a class action against their employer alleging that its employment
practices discriminated on the basis of race and sex in violation of Title
VII. 92 The plaintiffs served interrogatories upon the defendant requesting
detailed listings of its past and present employment practices. Compliance
would have required a considerable amount of statistical compilation by
the defendant. The trial court found that much of the requested material
was burdensome and irrelevant and therefore not discoverable. Judgment
was ultimately had for the defendant. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit re-
versed. After noting that in sex and race discrimination cases "statistics
often tell much and the courts listen," 93 the circuit court held that the in-
formation requested was relevant.94 As for the defendant's argument that
compliance would be unduly burdensome, the court said: "The point is
that open disclosure of allpotentially relevant information is the keynote of
the Federal Discovery Rules. In this case, that focal point has been ig-
nored." 95
Similarly, in Culp v. Devlin,96 the court rescinded a partial protective
knowledge, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in entering a protective order
preventing the plaintiff from deposing the president).
90. See, e.g., note 39 and accompanying text supra.
91. 483 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1973).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (1976).
93. 483 F.2d at 305.
94. Id at 305-06.
95. Id at 307 (emphasis added). In a case factually similar to Burns, a different result
was reached. In Jones v. Holy Cross Hosp. Silver Spring, Inc., 64 F.R.D. 586 (D. Md. 1974),
another Title VII action, the plaintiff served a set of 70 interrogatories on the defendant,
some containing up to 23 subparts. Although the court did not discuss the substance of the
material requested, it found that the defendant was "clearly" entitled to a protective order
against such overbroad interrogatories, and struck them, allowing the plaintiff leave to file a
"reasonable set." Id at 59 1. The only expressed justification for the order was that prepara-
tion of answers to the interrogatories would require the defendant to expend an unreasona-
ble amount of time and money to comply. If, in fact, the information requested was similar
to that in Burns, it would seem that the court in Jones erred by preventing the disclosure of
all potentially relevant information.
96. 78 F.R.D. 136 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
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order it had entered in favor of the defendants. In a civil rights action
against police and other officials of the city of Philadelphia, the plaintiffs
served an interrogatory requesting defendants to state the details of all al-
leged instances of police brutality over a three-year period. The district
court rescinded its prior partial protective order, even though it had found
that the production of documents necessary to answer the interrogatory
was burdensome to the defendants, because, "when weighed against the
plaintiffs need for this information to establish his case, that burden
placed upon the defendants does not seem undue."97
In Frost v. Williams ,98 however, the district court issued a protective or-
der in a civil action arising out of an automobile collision after the plaintiff
served the defendant with a set of 200 interrogatories. The information
requested included the color of defendant's hair and eyes, his place of
birth, the names and addresses of his parents and spouse, and the date and
place of his marriage and of any divorce. The court said that although it
was committed to the liberal use of interrogatories for legitimate purposes,
the use of 200 interrogatories, most of which came from a form book, was
oppressive and frivolous, and the court reprimanded plaintiffs counsel for
failing to exercise judgment in conducting discovery.9 9
The balancing test used by the courts in Burns, Cuip, and Frost is fairly
typical and requires a court, when entertaining a motion for a protective
order, to view good cause and the need for discovery in relation to the facts
and issues present in each individual case. For example, although a pro-
tective order was warranted in Frost, the court in Burns properly denied
one where the requested statistical compilation, although expensive and
time-consuming, would arm the plaintiffs with important proof necessary
to sustain their action. This illustrates the difficulty in determining
whether the costs and time involved in complying with a discovery request
warrant a protective order. What financial and temporal burdens are un-
due and will justify the issuance of a protective order depend, as the Culp
97. Id at 140. See also General Dynamics Corp. v. Selb Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1204, 1212
(8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1162 (1974) (protective order will not extend to blanket
refusals to answer interrogatories based on the privilege of self-incrimination). White v.
Wirtz, 402 F.2d 145, 148 (10th Cir. 1968) (if objections to discovery are not plain and specific
to show a basis in fact for conclusory statements that compliance would be burdensome, trial
court is entitled to deny motion for protective order); Flood v. Margis, 64 F.R.D. 59, 61
(E.D. Wis. 1974) (mere fact that interrogatories are lengthy or that the party would be put to
some trouble and expense in preparing the requested answers is not alone sufficient to war-
rant the granting of a protective order).
98. 46 F.R.D. 484 (D. Md. 1969).
99. Id at 485.
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court pointed out, on a party's need for the information to establish his
case.
Of course, motions for protective orders do not arise only when a re-
quested party asserts that compliance will be burdensome or that a discov-
ery request is made primarily to annoy or harass a party. But the balancing
test is applied in the same manner. In Johnson Foils, Inc. v. Huyck
Corp. "00 for example, the defendant sought a protective order to prevent
the plaintiff from discovering materials that the defendant alleged were
trade secrets, and therefore subject to protection under Rule 26(c)(7). ° '
The court refused to grant the order on the ground that a party had neither
an automatic nor an absolute right to hinder the discovery process merely
because sensitive information was involved in litigation. Both parties
should have meaningful access to the information sought where it can be
shown to be relevant to the prosecution or defense of a claim. ' 0 2 The court
continued:
Any protective order inhibiting liberal discovery must issue only
upon a specific showing that the information in question is of the
nature that its disclosure should be restricted and that the party
disclosing will indeed be harmed. . . . Moreover, the protective
order may only minimize the potential ill-effects to the party
making disclosures, e.g., limiting access to certain persons or the
public in general, but it should not prohibit the full disclosure of
all facts necessary to the litigation. This paramount concern lim-
its the discretion of the court to encumber the discovery process
except where good judgment dictates to the contrary. 103
This is not to suggest that the courts do not issue protective orders. They
do. " But in the required balancing, the courts usually rule in favor of
preventing any limitations on discovery. This result is not suprising in
view of the broad and liberal treatment the discovery rules are accorded,
100. 61 F.R.D. 405 (N.D.N.Y. 1973).
101. The court "may make any order which justice requires, .. including one or more
of the following: ... (7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or
commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way." FED. R.
Civ. P. 26(c)(7).
102. 61 F.R.D. at 409.
103. Id at 409-10. See also Lewis v. Capital Mortgage Investments, 78 F.R.D. 295, 311
(D. Md. 1978); United States v. IBM Corp., 67 F.R.D. 40, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (a protective
order will issue only when disclosure of allegedly confidential information will work a
"clearly defined and very serious injury" to a party's business).
104. See, e.g., notes 65-74 and accompanying text supra. See also Brennan v. Local 639,
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 494 F.2d 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d
Cir. 1973); Beacon v. R.M. Jones Apartment Rentals, 79 F.R.D. 141 (N.D. Ohio 1978);
Econo-Car Int'l., Inc. v. Antilles Car Rentals, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 8 (D.V.I. 1973); Balistrieri v.
Holtzman, 52 F.R.D. 23 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
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fostering discovery of any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could
lead to other matters that could bear on, any actual or potential issue in a
case.' °5 This tendency, however, enables litigants to make discovery re-
quests designed not to seek evidence supportive of their case, but to harass
and burden their opponents in order to obtain whatever advantages may
accrue from this tactic. And in attacking a motion for a protective order,
the party requesting discovery will often be successful merely by asserting
that the information sought is relevant to the prosecution or defense of its
claim and therefore discoverable.
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that judges often do not or can-
not take the time to familiarize themselves with the issues and facts of a
case at its pretrial stages. Thus a judge is likely to deny a request for a
protective order when the party seeking discovery merely asserts that the
information is relevant to an actual or potential issue in the case. °6 This
heightens the potential for abuse of the discovery process. For example, in
General Telephone & Electronics Laboratories, Inc. v. National Video
'Corp. ,o7 the defendant served an interrogatory on the plaintiff requesting
identification of all documents concerning phosphors produced within a
seventeen-month period. Phosphors are materials used in the production
of color television tubes, the subject matter of the defendant's antitrust
counterclaim in a patent infringement suit. The plaintiff asked for a pro-
tective order because the interrogatory as served could have involved
thousands of documents that did not relate to color television tubes. After
confessing to a lack of any expertise regarding the scientific matters ad-
dressed by the interrogatory, 0 8 the court denied the protective order. The
court reasoned that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for the
broadest possible discovery and found that the plaintiff failed to meet the
105. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978).
In 1978 the Federal Judicial Center conducted a survey of discovery practices in 3,000
randomly selected cases in the federal courts. The study found that 56.9% of motions for
protective orders succeeded. But what most interested the authors was the relative paucity of
such motions. Motions for protective orders were made in less than 5% of the discovery
"events." The authors suggested that two alternative inferences could be made about over-
broad discovery requests: either requesting parties do not often harass in using their rights
to obtain discovery, or requesting parties often harass in using requests, but requested par-
ties seldom use protecting motions to constrain harassment. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,
JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL LITIGATIVE PROCESS: DISCOVERY 106 (1978). The
authors could not say which inference was more reasonable, but did say that certain factors
restrict the use of protecting motions: the rule provisions governing the use of protecting
motions are "quite narrow" and the "'broad liberal treatment' to be accorded the discovery
rules . . . may deter expansive judicial interpretations of the preventing provisions." Id
106. See Developments in the Law - Discovery, 74 HARv. L. REV. 940, 983 (1961).
107. 297 F. Supp. 981 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
108. Id at 984.
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burden of showing that the defendant's interrogatory was "so annoying or
burdensome that it [could] not in justice be required to be answered even
in the face of the permissive rules of discovery . . .109
This is not to suggest that the court in General Telephone erred in deny-
ing the protective order, or that the defendant requested discovery solely to
harass or burden the plaintiff. Rather, the point is that a trial judge's rela-
tive lack of familiarity with a case-whether due to the complex technol-
ogy involved or to incomplete examination of the issues in the case-
prevents the judge from properly balancing the respective interests of all
parties when ruling on a motion for a protective order."
109. Id.
110. An additional problem facing litigants is the inability to appeal a judge's ruling on a
motion for a protective order because such rulings lack the necessary "finality" that is re-
quired before a circuit court of appeals may assert jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976).
Such rulings are characterized as interlocutory and, therefore, not appealable under § 1291
because they are "necessarily only a stage in the litigation and almost invariably involve no
determination of the substantive rights involved in the action." Borden Co. v. Sylk, 410
F.2d 843, 845 (3d Cir. 1969). See, e.g., Hudak v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 586 F.2d 105 (8th
Cir. 1978), cerl. denied, 440 U.S. 985 (1979); Dow Chem. Co. v. Taylor, 519 F.2d 352 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1033 (1975); Gialde v. Time, Inc., 480 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Anderson, 464 F.2d 1390 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Seegenerally 8 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2006 (1970). See also Cohen v. Beneficial
Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546-47 (1949). But see David v. Hooker, Ltd., 560 F.2d
412 (9th Cir. 1977); Dixon v. 80 Pine St. Corp., 516 F.2d 1278 (2d Cir. 1975). The result is
that there is rarely an effective remedy for an erroneous denial of a protective order. The
rationale for such a result is that the risk "must be balanced against the need for efficient
federal judicial administration as evidenced by the Congressional prohibition of piecemeal
appellate litigation" contained in section 1291. Borden Co. v. Sylk, 410 F.2d at 846.
A denial of a Rule 26(c) motion often results in a Rule 37(a) order compelling production
of the contested material. Notes of Advisory Committee on 1970 Amendments to Rule
26(c), 28 U.S.C. 7781 app. (1970). An unsuccessful movant may then refuse to comply with
that order and risk the imposition of civil contempt sanctions, which are sometimes appeala-
ble before final disposition of an action. See, e.g., Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, 519 F.2d 595,
598 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1033 (1975). The difficulty with this approach is that
failure to obey a Rule 37(a) order compelling discovery may result in dismissal of the action
or in a default judgment. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C). See notes 119-59 and accompanying
text infra. And appellate review in such an instance does not focus on any clearly defined
standards delineating when dismissal or default is indeed proper, but only on whether the
district court abused its discretion. See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey
Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 642 (1976).
Section 1292(b) of Title 28 allows for appeals to be taken from interlocutory orders upon
certification by the district court judge when he is "of the opinion that such order involves a
controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion
and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termina-
tion of the litigation... " 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976) (emphasis added). Because discovery
motions rarely involve controlling questions of law, however, certification of interlocutory
appeals relating to discovery occurs rarely. But see Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v.
Allied Artists Picture Corp., 602 F.2d 1062 (2d Cir. 1979); Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d
1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971).
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The approach most often suggested to remedy discovery abuse is to limit
discovery to more narrowly drawn categories of specific material, thus
making it easier for litigants and judges to determine what material is dis-
coverable. Unlike the present standard that allows discovery of any mate-
rial relevant to the subject matter involved in the action,I" this proposed
reform would limit discovery to material that is relevant "to the issues
raised by the claims or defenses of any party."' 12 The difficulty with this
approach, however, is that under the present system of notice pleading en-
gendered by the Rules, discovery is often used to frame the issues." 3 At
least in some cases, there can be no meaningful determination of the issues
without broad discovery, and without a complete determination of the is-
sues there can be no just disposition of an action. Further, the myriad of
issues and fact patterns present in cases in the federal courts prevents the
development of rigid standards that would be easily applicable in deciding
motions for protective orders in particular types of cases. What might be
grounds for issuing a protective order in one case would perhaps be wholly
inapposite in another case where there existed even the slightest variation
in the facts or issues presented.
Reform of the discovery rules will not decrease the frequency of discov-
ery abuse unless the legal profession is prepared for drastic changes that
would reshape the application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In
lieu of that, prevention of abusive, overbroad discovery requests designed
solely to harass or burden party-opponents must be based upon "what in
fact and in law are the ample powers of the district judge to prevent
abuse."'" The liberal discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are unquestionably broad and form an integral part of the over-
all scheme of litigation in federal courts. It is for this very reason that the
application of the discovery rules must be subject to the strict supervisory
discretion of the trial judge, "whose duty it is to ensure that the quest for
discovery does not subsume other important issues."'  Despite the oft-
stated principle that the discovery rules are to be utilized with minimal
intervention by the courts," 6 whenever a motion for a protective order is
I11. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
112. ABA Proposed Rule 26(b)(1), reprinted in Schroeder & Frank, The Proposed
Changes in the Discovery Rules, 1978 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 475, 507-08. See also Kaminsky, supra
note 6, at 998 (Discovery "shall be permissible as to any matter, not privileged, that has a
reasonable bearing upon any issue in the action.").
113. See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
114. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979).
115. Richards of Rockford, Inc. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 71 F.R.D. 388, 391 (N.D. Cal.
1976). See also Manual for Complex Litigation § 1.10 (1978).
116. See note 45 and accompanying text supra.
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made, a court must engage in a searching inquiry and become more famil-
iar with the facts and issues in order to determine whether a requesting
party's need for the material outweighs the burden and expense borne by
his opponent in complying with the request." 7 Rule 26(c) is more than
adequate to prevent discovery abuse, if the judge or magistrate forthrightly
applies it to the facts and issues present in the particular case at hand.
Only then can the balancing test currently employed under the discovery
rules and the good cause requirement of Rule 26(c) operate efficiently and
justly in preventing abuse of discovery.I'
117. See Pollak, Discovery:-Its Abuse and Correction, 80 F.R.D. 219, 227 (1978):
The faults of modem discovery methods and devices lie not with the Rules-they
can be left flexible. We face a device susceptible to mischief and harassment with
concomitant expense, that has been cut loose from judicial case management. That
should be remedied. This will not increase the burdens laid on the trial Judge-it
will transfer time from other functions in the case and collapse non-litigable issues.
The judge should get involved in the process early, sufficiently and informally.
There is no substitute for the regular involvement of the judge. . . . [Jiudicial case
management calls upon us to steer discovery away from the dangers of rigidity, on
the one hand, and formlessness, on the other.
An important aid to district court judges in effectuating control over, and understanding
of, the issues and facts present in a case is the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639
(1976). Section 636 provides in part: "Notwithstanding any provision of law to the con-
trary--(A) a judge may designate a magistrate to hear and determine any pretrial matter
pending before the court," except for several matters not including pretrial motions relating
to discovery. Id § 636(b)(l)(A). See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 268 (1976) (§ 636(b)
was enacted to permit the district courts to increase the scope of responsibilities that magis-
trates can undertake upon reference as part of the congressional plan "to establish a system
capable of increasing the overall efficiency of the Federal judiciary .. "). See also Cine
Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 602 F.2d 1062 (2d Cir.
1979).
Another tool available to judges is Rule 26(f), newly adopted and effective August 1, 1980:
At any time after commencement of an action the court may direct the attorneys
for the parties to appear before it for a conference on the subject of discovery ...
Following the discovery conference, the court shall enter an order tentatively
identifying the issues for discovery purposes, establishing a plan and schedule for
discovery, setting limitations on discovery, if any ...
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f). Cf. Manual for Complex Litigation §§ 1.50-1.80 (1978); N.D. OHIo
COMP. LIT. R. 2.04.
118. Of course, the primary blame for discovery abuse lies not with judges but with the
attorneys, and the provisions of Rule 26(c) do little to deter them. There are, however, other
tools which if properly used can operate as effective deterrents. For example, a lawyer who
takes action on behalf of his client violates a disciplinary rule of the American Bar Associa-
tion Code of Professional Responsibility when he knows, or should know, that his actions
serve merely to harass or injure another party. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
SIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(I). The appropriate sanctions would depend on the egregiousness of
an attorney's conduct during discovery, but bar associations should not be hesitant to act
against those who abuse the process.
Further, § 1927 of Title 28 provides that any attorney "who so multiplies the proceedings
in any case as to increase costs unreasonably and vexatiously may be required to satisfy
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III. RULE 37 AND A FAIR DAY IN COURT
While Rule 26(c) governs when a requested party is attacking a discov-
ery request viewed as overbroad and burdensome, Rule 37 applies when a
requesting party is unable to secure compliance from a recalcitrant oppo-
nent. That rule allows a party to move for an order compelling discov-
ery. "' Often a party will move for such an order in response to his
opponent's motion for a protective order.12 The rule further requires that
the losing party on a Rule 37(a) motion, or his attorney,' 2' pay the success-
ful party the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the mo-
tion, including attorney's fees. The court will not award these costs,
however, if it finds that making or opposing the motion was "substantialy
justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust." 22
personally such excess costs." 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1976). In at least one case, a court has
ordered costs taxed against an attorney where the attorney "unreasonably and vexatiously"
prolonged the taking of depositions by excessive cross-examination, and obstructed the ex-
amination of a witness by instructing him not to answer proper questions. Toledo Metal
Wheel Co. v. Foyer Bros. & Co., 223 F. 350, 358 (6th Cir. 1915). Butsee Roadway Express,
Inc. v. Piper, 100 S. Ct. 2455, 2461 (1980) (§ 1927 "costs" do not include attorneys' fees). See
generally Comment, Sanctions Imposed by Courts on Attorneys Who Abuse the Judicial Proc-
ess, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 619 (1977).
119. Rule 37(a) provides in part:
A party, upon reasonable notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby,
may apply for an order compelling discovery as follows:
(2) Motion. If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded or submitted
under Rules 30 or 31, or a corporation or other entity fails to make a designation
under Rule 30(b)(6) or 3 l(a), or a party fails to answer an interrogatory submitted
under Rule 33, or if a party, in response to a request for inspection under Rule 34,
fails to respond that inspection will be permitted as requested or fails to permit
inspection as requested, the discovering party may move for an order compelling
an answer, or a designation, or an order compelling inspection in accordance with
the request ...
(3) Evasive or Incomplete Answer. For purposes of this subdivision an evasive or
incomplete answer is to be treated as a failure to answer.
FED. R. Civ. P. 37 (a)(2), (3).
120. See, e.g., Ohio v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 570 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 833 (1978). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(2): "If the court denies the motion in
whole or in part, it may make such protective order as it would have been empowered to
make on a motion made pursuant to Rule 26(c)."
121. See, e.g., Szilvassy v. United States, 71 F.R.D. 589, 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
122. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4). See, e.g., Hayden Stone, Inc. v. Brode, 508 F.2d 895, 897
(7th Cir. 1974). Prior to 1970, an award of expenses could be made only if the winning party
could show that the losing party acted without substantial justification. The 1970 amend-
ments to Rule 37(a)(4), however, shifted the burden to the losing party. The rule now re-
quires an award of expenses unless the court finds that the losing party's conduct was
substantially justified. "[T]he change in language is intended to encourage judges to be
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Failure to comply with a Rule 37(a) order compelling discovery can
have severe consequences. Subdivision (b) of Rule 37 allows a court, in its
discretion, to make such orders "as are just," including: an order that des-
ignated facts relating to the disobeyed order shall be taken as established
for the purposes of the action;' 23 an order refusing to allow the disobedient
party to support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting
the party from introducing certain evidence; 124 or an order treating the
failure to obey as contempt of court. 2 5 The most drastic sanctions a court
can impose, however, are contained in subdivision (b)(2)(C), which per-
mits a court to make an order "striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or
staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the ac-
tion or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering ajudgment by default
against the disobedient party."'
' 26
Cases applying Rule 37(b)(2)(C) have often viewed the propriety of a
dismissal or default judgment in terms of whether the sanctioned party's
disobedience was willful. If it was, dismissal or default would be proper.
If failure to comply stemmed merely from negligence or oversight, dismis-
sal or default would not be proper in view of the availability of less ex-
treme sanctions designed to result in compliance with the previously
entered discovery order. For example, in Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time,
Inc. ,127 the district court had dismissed plaintiff's libel action for failure to
comply with a court order requiring it to produce an officer for deposition.
But the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that dismissal of an action is such a
drastic remedy that it should be applied only in extreme circumstances.
28
The court also said that although Rule 37(b) applies to all failures to com-
ply, whether willful or not, the presence of willfulness in a party's disobe-
more alert to abuses occurring in the discovery process." Notes of Advisory Committee to
1970 Amendments of Rule 37, 28 U.S.C. 464 app. (1976).
123. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A).
124. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(B).
125. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(D).
126. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C) (emphasis added). Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(d) (sanctions
available under subdivision (b)(2) are applicable when a party fails to appear for a deposi-
tion, to answer interrogatories, or to respond to requests for inspection, even though no
order compelling discovery had been made). But see Fox v. Studebaker-Worthington, Inc.,
516 F.2d 989, 996 (8th Cir. 1975) (where defendants had not sought an order compelling
discovery, imposition of sanction in the nature of deeming allegations of counterclaim as
admitted for plaintiff's failure to respond to discovery was improper).
Dismissal under Rule 37 operates as an adjudication on the merits and prevents a plaintiff
from reinstituting that part of his action that was dismissed. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b). The
same result holds true for any part of a defendant's counterclaim dismissed under Rule 37.
FED. R. Civ. P. 41(c).
127. 376 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 859 (1968).
128. Id at 121.
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dient conduct is relevant in determining the sanctions that should be
applied.' 29 Absent a finding of willfulness, dismissal was improper.
The emphasis in such cases has been on procuring eventual compliance
with the original order compelling discovery.130 But in 1976, the Supreme
Court altered this viewpoint when it placed its imprimatur on the use of
dismissal and default not merely to penalize those whose conduct war-
ranted the imposition of such sanctions, but to deter those who might be
tempted to engage in such conduct in the absence of a deterrent. In Na-
tional Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc. , 31 the district
court had dismissed respondents' antitrust action for failure to promptly
answer petitioner's interrogatories as ordered by the court. The district
court concluded that respondents' conduct exemplified "flagrant bad faith"
and "callous disregard of the responsibilities counsel owe to the Court and
to their opponents."' 32 The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the dis-
trict court had abused its discretion by dismissing the case where there was
insufficient evidence to support a finding that respondents' failure to com-
ply "was in flagrant bad faith, willful or intentional."' 33 The Supreme
Court reversed the court of appeals, saying that the question was not
129. Id. at 122. See also Vac-Air, Inc. v. John Mohr & Sons, Inc., 471 F.2d 231, 234 (7th
Cir. 1973) (default judgment was too harsh a sanction where failure to comply was partially
due to counsel's ill health and less extreme steps were available to effectuate compliance);
Gill v. Stolow, 240 F.2d 669, 670 (2d Cir. 1957) (only a serious showing of willful default can
justify denial of a party's fair day in court).
Cf. Societe Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rog-
ers, 357 U.S. 197, 212 (1958): "Rule 37 should not be construed to authorize dismissal...
because of petitioner's noncompliance with a pretrial production order when it has been
established that failure to comply has been due to inability, and not willfulness, bad faith, or
any fault of petitioner." In an action brought to recover assets that were seized by the
United States during World War II, the plaintiffs action was dismissed for its failure to
comply with a Rule 37 order although compliance would have subjected it, as a Swiss corpo-
ration, to criminal liability under Swiss law. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's
affirmance of dismissal because noncompliance stemmed from the plaintiffs inability to
comply; reversal was not mandated for lack of willfulness, but for lack of "willfulness, bad
faith or any fault" on the plaintiffs part. Id. (emphasis added). But cf. Ohio v. Arthur
Andersen & Co., 570 F.2d 1370, 1373 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1979)
(Rule 37(b) award of costs and attorney's fees upheld where defendant's claims of inability
to comply with order compelling discovery because of Swiss secrecy laws were found to be
no more than diversionary tactics).
130. See, e.g., Vac-Air, Inc. v. John Mohr & Sons, Inc., 471 F.2d 231, 234 (7th Cir. 1973).
131. 427 U.S. 639 (1976) (per curiam).
132. In re Professional Hockey Antitrust Litigation, 63 F.R.D. 641, 656 (E.D. Pa. 1974),
rep'd, 531 F.2d 1188 (3rd Cir.), rev'dper curiam sub nom. National Hockey League v. Metro-
politan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639 (1976).
133. In re Professional Hockey Antitrust Litigation, 531 F.2d 1188, 1195 (3rd Cir.), rev'd
per curiam sub nom. National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S.
639 (1976).
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whether it or the circuit court would have dismissed the action, but rather
"whether the District Court abused its discretion in so doing."' 34 The
Court found that the district court's findings of "callous disregard" and
"flagrant bad faith" were supported by the record,' 35 and said that:
[Hiere, as in other areas of the law, the most severe in the spec-
trum of sanctions provided by statute or rule must be available to
the district court in appropriate cases, not merely to penalize
those whose conduct may be deemed to warrant such a sanction,
but to deter those who might be tempted to such conduct in the
absence of such a deterrent. If the decision of the Court of Ap-
peals remained undisturbed in this case, it might well be that
these respondents would faithfully comply with all future discov-
ery orders entered by the District Court in this case. But other
parties to other lawsuits would feel freer than we think Rule 37
contemplates they should feel to flout other discovery orders of
other district courts. 1
3 6
Shortly after National Hockey League, the Ninth Circuit relied on the
Supreme Court's decision to uphold a district court's default judgment
against the defendants for the failure of one defendant, the sole owner of
the corporate defendants, to appear as ordered at a deposition. The case,
Anderson v. Air West Inc.,13 arose out of an action alleging violations of
securities laws. The court said that default was appropriate since the rec-
ord supported the district court's finding that the defendant's failure to
comply was due to his bad faith and willful disregard of judicial pro-
cess.' In addition, the court affirmed application of the default order to
the corporate defendants, noting that a district court has the power to enter
a default judgment against corporate defendants based on the failures of
their representatives.139
Similarly, in Margolis v. Johns, 4° the Seventh Circuit upheld dismissal
of plaintiffs slander action after he failed to comply with a discovery or-
der. The plaintiff argued on appeal that the district court ignored the ad-
134. 427 U.S. at 642.
135. Id
136. Id at 643 (emphasis in original). Cf. Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v. Allied
Artists Pictures Corp., 602 F.2d 1062, 1064 (2d Cir. 1979) ("[Ulnless Rule 37 is perceived as
a credible deterrent rather than a 'paper tiger,' . . . the pretrial quagmire threatens to engulf
the entire litigative process."). See generally Renfrew, Discovery Sanctions. A Judicial Per-
spective, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 264 (1979); Note, The Emerging Deterrence Orientation in the
Imposition of Discovery Sanctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1033 (1978).
137. 542 F.2d 1090 (9th Cir. 1976).
138. Id. at 1093.
139. Id
140. 587 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1978).
1981]
Catholic University Law Review
monition of a prior Seventh Circuit case that "where an alternative, less
drastic, sanction would be just as effective in effectuating compliance it
should be utilized."'' But the circuit court refused to apply its former
decision, saying that under National Hockey League it was not free to sub-
stitute its discretion for that of the district court. The court added that any
effort on its part "to promote lenity rather than the harshness of an out-
right dismissal" would undermine the important objective of preventing
discovery abuse that pervades Rule 37.142
In Dellums v. Powell ( Dellums JI), 143 a civil rights class action, the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit went so far as to reverse the district court's rein-
statement of a plaintiff against whom the district court had originally
dismissed the action for failure to answer interrogatories. The court of
appeals held that the district court abused its discretion by reinstating the
plaintiff when the record did not disclose any circumstances that could
mitigate his failure to discharge his obligations under Rule 37. The circuit
court felt that, if for no other reason than the prophylactic considerations
identified in National Hockey League, the plaintiffs claim should have
been dismissed.'"
But perhaps the furthest extension of the deterrence rationale appeared
recently in Cine Forty-Second Street Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures
Corp. 145 In an antitrust acton, the plaintiff disobeyed two orders entered
by a magistrate compelling discovery by dilatorily filing two sets of "seri-
ously deficient" answers to the defendants' interrogatories. The magistrate
recommended preclusion of proof of damages, the effect of which would
have been to leave the plaintiff with only a claim for injunctive relief. The
district court, however, refused to impose the extreme sanction recom-
mended because it believed there was no willful disobedience of the magis-
trate's order.' 46 The court, however, certified an interlocutory appeal to
the Second Circuit.
The question presented on appeal was whether gross negligence
amounting to a "total dereliction of professional responsibility," but not a
conscious disregard of court orders, permitted the extreme sanction recom-
mended. The court of appeals reversed the district court's failure to imple-
ment the magistrate's recommended sanction because, in the final analysis,
the question should not turn solely upon definition of the terms "negli-
141. Sapiro v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 452 F.2d 215, 216 (7th Cir. 1972).
142. 587 F.2d at 888.
143. 566 F.2d 231 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
144. Id. at 236.
145. 602 F.2d 1062 (2d Cir. 1979).
146. Id at 1067.
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gent" or "willful." The court concluded that the deterrent policy of Na-
tional Hockey League was best effectuated by requiring strict adherence to
"the responsibilities counsel owe to the Court and to their opponents."'
' 47
Negligent as well as intentional wrongs are fit subjects for general deter-
rence because "gross professional incompetence no less than deliberate
tactical intransigence may be responsible for the interminable delays and
costs that plague modem complex lawsuits." 148 The court explained that if
litigants are allowed to postpone compliance with discovery requests until
the judge loses patience with them, the effect will be to embroil the courts
in day-to-day supervision of discovery, a result directly contrary to the
overall scheme of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 149
Some circuits continue, however, to require a showing of willfulness on
the part of the disobedient party, or "extreme circumstances," before a dis-
trict court will be justified in dismissing an action or entering a default
judgment. 50 Two considerations underlie this seeming reluctance to im-
pose ultimate sanctions. First, judges often cite the policy embodied in the
federal rules of deciding cases on the merits rather than on procedural
infirmities.'"' Second, discovery abuse is most often the result of counsel's
misconduct in an area over which a litigant has little control, if he is even
aware of its existence. 5
2
Arguably, however, these considerations do not justify judicial reluc-
tance to impose sanctions on parties who abuse discovery. First, concern
for a recalcitrant and disobedient party's right to adjudication on the mer-
its ignores similar considerations of fairness to the opposing party. The
147. Id
148. Id
149. Id at 1068. In a concurring opinion, Judge Oakes pointed out that if the fault for
delay lies with the complexity of the interrogatories and the requests of opposing counsel,
remedy lies with an application for a protective order under Rule 26(c). Id at 1068-69
(Oakes, J., concurring).
150. Epstein, Corcoran, Krieger, & Carr, An Up-date on Rule 37 Sanctions after National
Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 84 F.R.D. 145, 169 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Up-date]. See, e.g., Kropp v. Ziebarth, 557 F.2d 142 (8th Cir. 1977); Dudley v.
South Jersey Metal, Inc., 555 F.2d 96 (3rd Cir. 1977). See also EEOC v. Carter Carburetor
Div. of ACF Indus., 577 F.2d 43, 49 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1081 (1979)
(imposition of sanctions taking certain facts as established and limiting plaintiffs claim was
reversible error where the defendant's dilatory tactics were at least the equal of the plain-
tiff's); Griffin v. Aluminum Co. of America, 564 F.2d 1171, 1173 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam)
(dismissal of non-lawyer plaintiff's pro se action was reversed since the aim of deterrence
would be little served by imposing the sanction of last resort on an unassisted layman).
151. See, e.g., Edgar v. Slaughter, 548 F.2d 770, 772-73 (8th Cir. 1977); Scarver v. Allen,
457 F.2d 308, 310 (7th Cir. 1972).
152. See, e.g., Edgar v. Slaughter, 548 F.2d at 773; Flaks v. Koegel, 504 F.2d 702, 712 (2d
Cir. 1974) ("If counsel rather than the client were at fault .... then the order entering the
default judgment was an abuse of discretion."). See also Kaminsky, supra note 6, at 984.
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discovery rules envision broad discovery in order to promote civil trials
conducted with open disclosure.- 3 Failure to cooperate in discovery and
disobedience of explicit court orders frustrate this objective and prevent
the blameless litigant from obtaining his fair day in court. As the Ninth
Circuit adroitly pointed out in Anderson v. Air West, Inc., a party's failure
to comply with orders compelling discovery designed to assist in the deter-
mination of the factual issues present in a case should constitute "a forfei-
ture on his part . . . of the right to contest those factual issues."' 54
Further, there is a reasonable response to the contention that dismissal
of a party's claim, or a default judgment against him, because of his coun-
sel's inexcusable and abusive conduct during discovery, imposes an unjust
penalty on the often innocent client. In Link v. Wabash R.R. ,55 the
Supreme Court rejected a similar argument while affirming a district
court's sua sponte dismissal for failure to prosecute. The Court pointed out
that the petitioner voluntarily chose the attorney as his representative in
the action, and he therefore could not avoid the consequences of the acts
or omissions of such a freely selected agent. The court concluded that any
other notion would be inconsistent with a system of representative litiga-
tion, in which each party is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent
and is considered, via that attorney, to have notice of all the facts present
in his case. ' 56
More importantly, after National Hockey League, the mere considera-
tion of such concerns detracts from the important, if not primary, purpose
of Rule 37(b) "to deter those who might be tempted to such conduct in the
absence of such a deterrent."' 57 The rule governs the imposition of sanc-
tions. It is therefore punitive, and an important component of punishment
is deterrence. Unlike alleged overbroad discovery requests and resulting
motions for protective orders, the disposition of which turn on the in-
153. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947); FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
154. Anderson v. Air West, Inc., 542 F.2d 1090, 1093 (9th Cir. 1976).
155. 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
156. Id at 633-34. See also Up-date, supra note 150, at 172-73:
Although courts seem happier in imposing sanctions where there is an indication
that the client participated in the dilatory tactics, they have on occasion visited the
fault of negligent attorneys upon innocent clients. In such instances the courts
have not been reluctant to suggest that the dilatory tactics have amounted to un-
professional behavior on the part of attorneys whose consequences are justly vis-
ited upon their clients. Nor have the courts been reluctant to hint that a client's
relief from the imposition of sanctions resulting from the attorney's professional
malfeasance or nonfeasance might well be a malpractice claim brought by the cli-
ent against the attorney. . . . As a corollary, attorneys should also consider with-
drawing where cooperation is not forthcoming from their clients.
157. National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. at 643.
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formed discretion of trial judges intimately involved with the facts and
issues unique to the particular cases at hand, 58 failure to comply with a
court's discovery order is just that: a failure. Absent excusable inability
unrelated to the party's conduct, which precludes the imposition of sanc-
tions, 5 9 the federal courts must be aware of their responsibility to utilize
the sanctions of Rule 37(b) to the fullest extent practicable in order to ef-
fectuate full discovery.
IV. CONCLUSION
The prophylactic terms of Rules 26(c) and 37 are available in almost all
instances of discovery abuse in federal courts. Properly applied, they are
adequate to combat and deter parties and counsel who would subvert their
opponent's right to secure discovery of all material relevant to the subject
matter involved in the action, and his equally important right to be free
from harassing and overbroad discovery requests designed to create undue
burden and expense.
Discovery abuse persists when judges fail to appreciate that the impor-
tance of discovery in the federal judicial scheme requires that they be vigi-
lant in preventing abuse. This vigilance requires expenditure of judicial
resources to discern what facts and issues exist in particular cases and thus
warrant the broad and liberal treatment of the discovery provisions of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Courts cannot be unmindful of the real-
ity that discovery abuse prevents the blameless party from getting his fair
day in court. For this reason alone, the courts should not tolerate abuse of
discovery and must utilize the several powers they have under Rules 26(c)
and 37 to make known their intolerance. Ineffective administration of
these rules undermines the safeguards for litigants. Adequate on their
face, if they are not properly applied by the courts, their preventive effect
may become so diluted as to compel reform in order to preserve the just
results they seek to promote.
Timothy Joyce
158. See notes 61-118 and accompanying text supra.
159. See, e.g., Societe Internationales pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales,
S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958), discussed in note 129 supra; Kropp v. Ziebarth, 557 F.2d
142 (8th Cir. 1977).
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